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A Practitioner's Guide to Pennsylvania's
Newly Adopted Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act
Robert J. Ridge*
Ellen G. McGlone "
I. Introduction
On December 3, 1993, the Pennsylvania Legislature substantially
altered the nature of creditors' rights within the Commonwealth by
repealing Pennsylvania's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act ("Pa. UFCA") and replacing it with Pennsylvania's version of the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("Pa. UFTA"). According to the
statute's drafters, the switch to the Pa. UFTA was necessary to modernize
and clarify the Pa. UFCA and to make Pennsylvania's law consistent with
the laws of other states and the federal bankruptcy laws.' Although the
Pa. UFTA is hailed as a refinement of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act ("UFTA") and is purported to be "reflective of Pennsylvania
practice, '"2 the unstated and perhaps unintentional result of the
legislature's "modernization" and "synchronization" of Pennsylvania's
fraudulent conveyance law is to dilute the rights of creditors in
Pennsylvania. Honest creditors who were once protected by the Pa.
UFCA will now have a more difficult time pursuing fraudulent debtors
under the Pa. UFTA.
A. Development of the Law of Fraudulent Transfers
The laws forbidding fraudulent conveyances have their origin in the
ancient Statute of 13 Elizabeth which was enacted in 1571. The Statute
of 13 Elizabeth was designed to protect creditors by forestalling debtors
from transferring their assets to friendly hands, thereby frustrating
clamoring creditors.
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA") was developed
in 1918 by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as

*Robert J. Ridge is a partner at the firm of Katarincic & Salmon, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Prior to entering private practice, Mr. Ridge served as an Assistant State Attorney, Dade County,
Florida and a Trial Attorney, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice.
"Ellen G. McGlone is an associate at Katarincic & Salmon.
1. See Report on the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act with Committee
Comments (May 21, 1994).
2. Introduction, Report on the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (May 21, 1994).
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a "codification of the 'better' decisions applying the Statute of 13
Elizabeth. 3 In particular, the Commissioners drafted provisions
governing constructive fraud, that is, fraud which is implied from the
existence of certain, well-recognized facts, regardless of the transferor's
intent. In the absence of such facts, actual fraudulent intent could also
be proven under the UFCA. Pennsylvania adopted the UFCA in 1921.
The Federal Bankruptcy Code provision which governs fraudulent
transfers,4 Section 548, is derived from both the Statute of 13 Elizabeth
and the UFCA.' However, the Bankruptcy Code differs from both of
these statutes in that the Code is not based on the policy of protecting
creditors; rather, "a central purpose of the Code" is providing certain
debtors with a "fresh start."' As a result, Section 548 of the Code
provides less protection to creditors than the UFCA.
Nonetheless, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws looked to the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 when they developed the
UFTA as a replacement for the UFCA.7 A stated reason of the
Commissioners in creating the UFTA was to devise a fraudulent transfer
law that closely paralleled the federal bankruptcy laws.8 In addition to
bringing state law more in line with federal law, the UFTA was
purportedly designed to enhance creditors' remedies against transferees,
create new defenses for fraudulent transfer defendants, .eliminate the
"good faith" element of the UFCA's definition of "fair consideration,"
and provide a statutory enumeration of the types of facts which may be
taken into account when considering the issue of actual intent to defraud.
In 1993, Pennsylvania became the thirty-first state to adopt the UFTA,
following California, Texas, Florida, and others.
In evaluating the need for an updated and uniform version of the law
of fraudulent conveyances, the Commissioners concentrated on
synchronizing the statutory structures of the law of fraudulent
conveyances with the Bankruptcy Code, and they concentrated on
eliminating obvious gaps in the coverage of the existing law governing
fraudulent transactions. What the drafters of the Pa. UFTA apparently
did not consider, but which will be considered in this article, is how the
replacement of the Pa. UFCA with the Pa. UFTA will alter the
Pennsylvania common law created by judicial application of the Pa.
3. Annex to Introduction: Prefatory Note to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

11 U.S.C. § 548.
4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 548.0111] (15th ed. 1992).
See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1990).
See Prefatory Note to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
Id.
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UFCA, how the nuances of that judge-made law created important
advantages for creditors, and how application of the Pa. UFTA might
work subtle, unintended changes on the rights of debtors and creditors.
Part II of this article will compare generally the Pa. UFTA and the
Pa. UFCA. Parts III and IV will discuss actual fraud and constructive
fraud, will evaluate the likely reconfiguration of the rights between
debtors and creditors that have resulted from the legislature's decision to
replace the Pa. UFCA with the Pa. UFTA, and will examine the net
effect of adoption of the Pa. UFTA on the litigators who will attempt to
enforce its provisions. Part V will examine other issues that are
associated with the adoption of the Pa. UFTA.
II. Similarities Between the Pa. UFTA and the Pa. UFCA
As a result of their common origins, the Pa. UFCA, the Pa. UFTA,
and the fraudulent transfer portions of the Bankruptcy Code have several
common components. First, all three statutes have provisions that
prohibit intentional fraud by proscribing transactions designed to defraud,
hinder, or delay creditors.9 Second, all three statutes recognize the
notion of constructive fraud, that is, fraud which is implied from the
existence of certain, well-recognized facts, regardless of the transferor's
actual intent.' ° Finally, all three statutes place significance upon the
transferor's financial circumstances at the time of the transfer." While
other similarities among the laws of fraudulent conveyances may exist,
these similarities represent the common threads that link all three statutes
to their ancient ancestors.
Ironically, these common threads also represent the obvious points
of divergence among the three statutes. Most of the differences among
the statutes can be traced to the competing policies upon which the
statutes are based, that is, the policy of creditor protection upon which the
Pa. UFCA is based and the policy of debtor protection upon which the
Bankruptcy Code is grounded.
III. Actual Intent To Defraud
The Bankruptcy Code, the Pa. UFTA, and the Pa. UFCA all contain
similarly worded provisions that characterize, as fraudulent, transfers that

9. I1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1); 39 PA. STAT. § 357 (repealed 1993); 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5104(a)(1).
10. !1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2); 39 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 354, 355 (repealed 1993); 12 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § il104; 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5105.
II. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2); 39 PA. STAT. ANN. § 354 (repealed 1993); 12 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5105.
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have been made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors.' 2 The Pa. UFTA diverges from the other two statutes by
specifically enumerating certain "Badges of Fraud"' 3 from which the
trier of fact may infer an actual intent to defraud.
"'Badges of Fraud' are circumstances so frequently attending
fraudulent transfers that the inference of fraud arises from them.'f 4 The
drafters of the UFTA thought that by specifically enumerating the Badges
of Fraud they would help the courts and practitioners in "appraising the
welter of allegations and proof that may be tendered by the litigants in a
case under the [UFTA]."'"

12. I1U.S.C. § 548. Fraudulent transfers and obligations
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(i) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date
that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; ...
2. 39 PA. STAT. § 357 (repealed 1993). Conveyance made with intent to defraud
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from
intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.
12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104. Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors
(a) General rule-A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as
to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation:
(I) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor;...
13. 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104(b)
Certain Factors-In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), consideration may
be given, among other factors, to whether:
(I) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the
transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been
sued or threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(6) the debtor absconded;
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent
to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was
incurred; and
(I1) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
14. Profeta v. Lombardo, 600 N.E.2d 360, 364 (Ohio Ct, App. 1991) (citations omitted).
15.

Frank R. Kennedy, THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT, 18 UCC L.J.195, 201
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The Pa. UFCA did not contain a listing of the Badges of Fraud.
Rather, under the Pa. UFCA, the courts recognized that "[slince fraud is
usually denied, it must be inferred from all facts and circumstances
surrounding the conveyance, including subsequent conduct."' 6
In
particular, "[w]here the transferor and transferee have knowledge of the
claims of creditors and know that creditors cannot be paid and where
consideration is lacking for the transfer the court may infer an intent to
hinder delay or defraud creditors."' 7
Pennsylvania courts have long permitted the trier of fact to infer
actual fraud from facts and circumstances that resemble the Badges of
Fraud which are found in the Pa. UFTA. In addition, Pennsylvania
courts have previously referred to the UFTA's Badges of Fraud in
determining whether a conveyance was made with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors under the Pa. UFCA. 1
A specific statutory listing of the Badges of Fraud, therefore, does
nothing to expand the fraudulent transfer theories upon which
Pennsylvania creditors may rely. To the contrary, rather than simplifying
the actual fraud analysis for the trier of fact, the Badges of Fraud may
well make proving intentional fraud more difficult under the Pa. UFTA
than under the Pa. UFCA. Because the list of the Badges of Fraud is, by
its own terms, not inclusive, the list serves only as a legislative
acknowledgement of well-recognized indicia of fraud. As a practical
matter, the Badges of Fraud will most likely serve as the basis for a jury
instruction that is as likely to confuse a jury as it is to enlighten it.
Although proof of one or more of the Badges of Fraud does not
create a presumption of a fraudulent transfer, 9 the effect of such a list

(1986). Professor Kennedy was the reporter for the committee which drafted the UFTA.
16. Godina v. Oswald, 211 A.2d 91, 93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965) (citing Sheffitv. Koff, 100 A.2d
393, 395 (Pa. Super. Ct 1953) (citation omitted)). See Continental Bank v. Marcus, 363 A.2d 1318,
1321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (holding that "[actual] intent may be established by circumstantial
evidence") (citation omitted).
17. United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 580 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd in part
and remanded, United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); see Voest-Alpine Trading USA
Corp. v. Vantage Steel, 732 F. Supp. 1315, 1324 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Godina v. Oswald, 211 A.2d 91
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1965) (holding that a jury could infer intent to defraud creditors from relationship
between transferor and transferee and that transfer occurred immediately before civil trial in which
transferor was a defendant).
18. See Moody v. Security Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 127 BR. 958, 991 (W.D. Pa. 1991), af'd971
F.2d 1056 (3rd Cir. 1992); In re Pinto Trucking Service, Inc., 93 B.R. 379, 386-88 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988); In re Compton, 70 BR. 60, 62 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987).
19. Comment (5) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5104(b). See Lindholm v. Holtz, 581 N.E.2d
860, 864 (III. App. Ct. 1991) (interpreting Rich v. Rich, 405 S.E.2d 858 (W. Va. 1991)); Citizens
State Bank v. Leth, 450 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the presence of
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on the trier of fact cannot be denied.
Indeed, observers and
commentators, involved in the deliberations of the drafting committee of
the UFTA, criticized the inclusion of the Badges of Fraud.2" They
objected largely because "evidence of the presence of one of the factors
named in a case would be given disproportionate significance by the trier
21
of fact."
Conversely, legislative recognition of a list of common indicators of
fraud may suggest to a jury that dishonest conduct must either fit within
one of the categories enumerated in the statute or fall outside the purview
of the law of fraudulent conveyances. The Badges of Fraud list attempts
to categorize fraudulent conduct which, in all probability, defies
categorization. Indeed, "the law does not define fraud; it needs no
definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versatile as human
ingenuity." 22 The danger of such categorization is that juries will be
tempted to pigeonhole all fraudulent actions into this specific list. A jury
may not consider, as fraudulent, behavior that does not fit into any of the
statutory Badges of Fraud even though that conduct may, in fact, be
fraudulent.
Consequently, if defense lawyers responding to allegations of actual
fraud are entitled to a jury instruction delineating the Badges of Fraud,
they may use that instruction as a device to convince jurors that their
clients' behavior falls outside the parameters of the Badges of Fraud and,
therefore, cannot amount to serious evidence of fraudulent intent. The
absence of evidence of a specifically delineated Badge of Fraud will
enable defense lawyers to argue that the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy
their substantial burdens, notwithstanding ample evidence of fraudulent
conduct that falls outside the categories of conduct created by the Badges
of Fraud provision in the Pa. UFTA.
Furthermore, neither the UFTA nor the interpretative case law from
other jurisdictions offer proper guidance in applying the Badges of Fraud.
It is unclear whether conduct may constitute actual fraud under the Pa.
UFTA if it does not include at least one of the Badges of Fraud or
involves only one or two of the Badges of Fraud and is otherwise not
objectionable. In summary, while the Pa. UFTA's list of the Badges of
Fraud may, at first blush, appear to be a sword in the hands of creditors,

several Badges of Fraud supported a finding of actual intent); U.S. v. Romano, 757 F. Supp. 1331,
1337 (M.D. Fla. 1989), affd 918 F.2d 182 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) (same).
20. Kennedy, 18 U.C.C. L.J. at 201.
21. Kennedy, U.C.C. . at 201.
22. United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406,410 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Weiss v. U.S., 122 F.2d
675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941)).
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it may well prove to be a shield in the hands of debtors and their
transferees.
The danger in specifically enumerating Badges of Fraud cannot be
viewed out of context. Pursuant to section 357 of the UFCA and section
548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
actual intent to defraud by clear and convincing evidence.2 3 The new
statute will not change this burden of persuasion.2 4 However, an
undesirable and presumably unintended consequence of the Pa. UFTA's
adoption of the Badges of Fraud may be that defense attorneys will seize
upon the absence of several Badges of Fraud to argue that the plaintiffs'
evidence cannot meet this weighty burden.
IV. Constructive Fraud
The Code, the Pa. UFCA, and the Pa. UFTA all recognize that,
under certain circumstances, a transfer or an incurred obligation may be
constructively fraudulent; that is, the circumstances are such that the
intent of the transferor is irrelevant to a determination of fraud.

23. See Moody, 127 B.R. at 990 (citing United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556,
580 (M.D. Pa. 1983), affd in part and remanded, United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803
F.2d 1288 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 483 U.S. 1005
(1987); In re DeVito, 11 B.R. 529, 531 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990)); In re Metro Shippers, Inc., 78
B.R. 747, 750-51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). But see Chorost v. Grand Rapids Factory Showrooms,
77 F. Supp. 276, 280 (D. N.J. 1948) (holding that actual intent to defraud creditors must be proved
by a "fair preponderance of evidence"), a~fd, 172 F.2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1949).
24. See Reddy v. Gonzalez, 8 Cal. App. 4th 118, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (applying
California's version of § 5104 A and noting that "actual intent to defraud must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence").
25. 1I U.S.C. § 548. Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily...
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or
a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably
small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be
beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
39 PA. STAT. ANN. § 354 (repealed 1993). Conveyances by insolvents
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be
thereby rendered insolvent, is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his actual
intent,if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration.
39 PA. STAT. ANN. § 355 (repealed 1993). Conveyances by persons in business
Every conveyance made without fair consideration, when the person making it is engaged,
or is about to engage, in a business or transaction for which the property remaining in his
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Pursuant to all three statutes, a transfer is constructively fraudulent if
made for inadequate consideration and, if 1) the transferor was insolvent
when the transfer was made or became insolvent due to the transfer; 2)
the transferor was undercapitalized after the transfer; or 3) the debtor
believed he would incur debts that would be beyond his ability to pay.26
A. Constructive Fraud: Transfers by Insolvents
Of the three forms of constructive fraud recognized by the statutes,
the provisions governing transfers made by insolvents are the most
important," and have been most frequently utilized by creditors.
Pennsylvania law has historically favored the rights of creditors in
constructive fraud cases as evidenced by the evidentiary principles of
burden shifting which developed under the Pa. UFCA. Pursuant to these
principles, after a plaintiff proved that the transferor transferred an asset
while in debt, the burden then shifted to the party defending the
transaction to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the debtor was
not insolvent at the time of the transaction, was not rendered insolvent by

hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors,
and as to other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such business or
transaction, without regard to his actual intent.
39 PA. STAT. § 356 (repealed 1993). Conveyances by a person who is about to incur
debts
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair consideration,
when the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends or
believes that he will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.
12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5104. Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors
(a) General rule.-A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to
a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:...
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer
or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were un.reasonably small in relation
to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the
debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became
due.
12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5105. Transfers fraudulent as to present creditors
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor
whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the
debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent
at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
26. I1 U.S.C. § 548(a); 39 PA. STAT. § 354-356; 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104(a)(2).
27. 5 Debtor-Creditor Law § 22.04[B] (Theodore Eisenberg ed., Times-Mirror Books 1990).

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER

ACT

the transaction, or that the transferor received fair consideration for the
object transferred.
Unfortunately for creditors, the drafters of the Pa. UFTA have
rejected this burden shifting doctrine as an "archaism," which "in any
event should not be followed" in applying the Pa. UFTA.2" However,
the drafters did not reject evidentiary fictions completely; rather, they
substituted a rebuttable presumption of insolvency that makes certain
changes in the order and burdens of proof. The Pa. UFTA also
significantly changes the Pa. UFCA's definition of insolvency and deletes
the Pa. UFCA's good faith component of fair consideration. In total,
these modifications will make proving constructive fraud considerably
more difficult for creditors under the new statute.
B. Rebuttable Presumptionof Insolvency
The Pa. UFTA contains a rebuttable presumption of insolvency,29
not found in either the Bankruptcy Code or in the Pa. UFCA, which
provides that a debtor who is not generally paying his debts as they
become due is presumed to be insolvent. Once a debtor is found to be
presumptively insolvent, the burden of proof switches to the debtor to
demonstrate that "the nonexistence of insolvency is more probable than
its existence."30 Determining whether a debtor is generally not paying
his debts as they become due "[calls] for inquiry mainly into the extent
to which the debtor is now actually paying debts presently due."'" More
specifically,
[iun determining whether a debtor is paying its debts generally as they
become due, the court should look at more than the amount and due
dates of the indebtedness. The court should also take into account
such factors as the number of the debtor's debts, the proportion of
those debts not being paid, the duration of the nonpayment, and the
existence of bona fide disputes or other special circumstances alleged
to constitute an explanation for the stoppage of payments. The
court's determination may be affected by a consideration of the
debtors' payment practices prior to the period of alleged nonpayment

28. Comment (6) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102.
29. 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5102(b)
Presumption of insolvency.-A debtor who is generally not paying the debtor's debts as
they become due is presumed to be insolvent This presumption shall impose on the party
against whom the presumption is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of
insolvency is more probable than its existence.
30. Id.
31. Comment (4) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5104 (emphasis included).
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and the payment practices of the trade or industry in which the debtor
is engaged.32
Moreover, the Comment to 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 5102 notes
that general nonpayment of debts as they become due constitutes a
ground for filing an involuntary petition pursuant to section 303(h)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code, and cites to opinions interpreting that section of the
Bankruptcy Code.3 ' Accordingly, the following language discussing
whether debtors are generally paying their debts under section 303(h)(1)
is helpful in understanding the test of presumed insolvency.
The relevant standard for determining whether or not an alleged
debtor is generally paying its debts is not a mechanical one. (citation
omitted) Rather, it is flexible and involves consideration of the
totality of the circumstances and requires a balancing of the interests
of the alleged debtor against the interests of its creditors. (citation
omitted).
A determination that an alleged debtor generally is not paying
its debts as they become due requires a more general showing of their
financial condition and debt structure than simply establishing the
existence ofa few unpaid bills. (emphasis added)...

The burden of

establishing that [the alleged debtor] generally is not paying its debts
(citation
as they become due is upon petitioning creditors.
omitted).34
Once a creditor establishes that the transferor is presumptively
insolvent, the party against whom the presumption of insolvency is
directed carries the burden of proving that "the nonexistence of
In support of the
insolvency is more probable than its existence."
adoption of the rebuttable presumption, the drafters of the Pa. UFTA
noted the difficulties creditors often experience in proving insolvency
because the relevant information is held by a "non-cooperative debtor"
whose records are "more often than not incomplete and inaccurate." 6
Conversely, under section 354 of the Pa. UFCA, Pennsylvania courts
have held that the party attacking the conveyance need only establish that
the person conveying the property was in debt at the time of the
conveyance.37 A "debt" is any existing legal liability, "whether matured

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
993; In

Comment (2) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102.
See Comment (2) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102.
See In re Petro Fill, Inc., 144 B.R. 26, 30 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5102(b).
Comment (2) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102.
First Nat'l Bank of Marietta v. Hoffines, 239 A.2d 458, 462 (1968); Moody, 127 B.R. at
re Pittsburgh Cut Flower Co., 124 B.R. 451, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991).
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or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or
contingent."3" Under the Pa. UFCA, upon the plaintiff's showing that
the transferor was in debt at the time of the transfer, the burden of proof
shifted to the party defending the transfer to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the debtor was solvent at the time of the
conveyance or was not rendered insolvent thereby, or that the debtor
received fair consideration for the conveyance. 9 The party defending
the transfer carries a demanding burden of proving these elements.
Under the clear and convincing evidence standard, the party defending
the transfer must prove his case such that "[there is] no substantial doubt
in [one's] mind. It is proof that establishes . . . not only [that] the
proposition at issue is probable, but also that it is highly probable."'
Unless the party defending the transfer meets this burden, the transfer will
be considered fraudulent.
Thus, under the Pa. UFTA, proving insolvency will present obstacles
to creditors that were not present under the Pa. UFCA. Moreover, given
that the stated purpose of the drafters of the Pa. UFTA in establishing the
rebuttable presumption of insolvency was to place the burden of proving
insolvency on the debtors because they presumably possess the relevant
information,4 the adoption of the rebuttable presumption has led to the
anomalous result of creditors having to provide more information about
debtors under the Pa. UFTA than was previously required under the Pa.
UFCA.

38. Baker v. Geist, 321 A.2d 634, 636 (1974) (citing 39 Purdon § 351 (1954)).
39. Speiser v. Schmidt, 563 A.2d 927, 931 (Pa. Super. 1989); Hoffines, 239 A.2d at 462;
Moody, 127 B.R. at 993 (quoting Hoffines, 239 A.2d at 462 (1968)).
A minority of Pennsylvania cases have held that the creditor bears the burden of proving
inadequate consideration. In the 1992 case Garden State Standardbred v. Seese, 611 A.2d 1239 (Pa.
Super.), the Pennsylvania Superior Court defied precedent by expanding the creditor's burden to
include proof that fair consideration was not received for the exchange. Interestingly, the citation
following this statement was to First Bank of Marietta v. Hoffines, 239 A.2d 458 (Pa. 1968).
Hoffines does not support this proposition and in fact clearly states that the trustee must show that
"the person conveying the property was in debt at the time he made the conveyance, [and] then the
burden rests upon the grantee ...to establish ...that the person conveying was then solvent and
was not by such conveyance rendered insolvent or that a fair consideration had been paid for the
conveyance." Hoffines, 239 A.2d at 462. Contrary to the holding in Seese, the transferee carries the
burden of proving that the debtor received an inadequate consideration for the conveyance. This
holding is strongly supported by Pennsylvania precedent See Moody, 127 B.R. at 993; In re
Pittsburgh Cut Flower Co., 124 B.R. at 457. See also In re Pinto Trucking Service, 93 B.R. at 380
(stating incorrectly that no authority supports proposition that trustee does not carry burden of
proving inadequate consideration).
40. 3 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modem Federal Jury Instructions, § 73.01, at 73-15 (1993), citing
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
41. See Comment (2) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102.
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For example, to shift the burden of proof from creditors to debtors
under section 5102 of the Pa. UFTA, creditors will have to show much
more about transferors' financial conditions. The mere fact that
transferors were "in debt," as previously required under section 354 of
the Pa. UFCA, will no longer suffice. Also, since the drafters of the Pa.
UFTA-have rejected the principles of burden shifting previously required
under the Pa. UFCA, presumptively insolvent debtors will only be
required to demonstrate the nonexistence of insolvency and will not be
forced to show by clear and convincing evidence either that the
transferors have received reasonably equivalent value for the transfer or
that they have met the financial conditions delineated in section
5104(a)(2) and section 5105.42 Conversely, the Pa. UFCA required
transferors who were "in debt" to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that they were solvent at the time of the conveyance, were not rendered
insolvent by the conveyance, or that the debtors received fair
consideration, i.e., fair equivalent for the transfer received in good
faith.43
Under the Pa. UFTA, the debtor need only prove that "the
nonexistence of insolvency is more probable than its existence." 4 This
is not nearly as exacting a burden of persuasion as was the clear and
convincing standard required under section 354 of the Pa. UFCA. It
appears, therefore, that in an effort to do away with the "archaism" of
burden shifting, the drafters of the Pa. UFTA have made it easier for
those who are defending an allegedly fraudulent conveyance to defeat a
cause of action based upon the constructive fraud provisions of the
statute.
C. Definition of Insolvency
The Pa. UFTA adopted the "balance sheet" definition of insolvency
presently found in the Bankruptcy Code.45 Pursuant to the Pa. UFTA,

42.
43.

See Comment (6) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102.
See Michael L. Cook & Richard E. Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: An

Introductory Critique, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87 (1988); 5 Fisher, et al., Debtor-Creditor Law
22.03[D][I].
44. 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5102(b).
45.

11 U.S.C. § 101(32). "Insolvent" means

-

(A) with reference to an entity other than a partnership and a municipality, financial
condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's
property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of (i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud such entity's creditors; and
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate under section 522
of this title ... See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d
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"a person is 'insolvent' if, at 'fair valuations,' debts exceed assets.""
Because the "balance sheet" test is narrower than the insolvency test
found in the Pa. UFCA, establishing insolvency will be more difficult
under the Pa. UFTA than under the Pa. UFCA.
The Pa. UFTA does not define the term "fair valuation," which is
used in the definition of insolvency, nor does it delineate particular
methods for determining "fair valuation."
However, the drafters'
comments demonstrate that the economic realities of the debtor must be
considered. For example,
[d]ifferent bases of valuation may be appropriate depending upon the
circumstances, and different methods of determining value on any
particular basis may be appropriate depending upon the business
engaged in by the debtor and other factors. For a debtor which is a
business enterprise, valuation on the basis of continuation of the
business by the debtor as a going concern ordinarily would be the
appropriate basis of valuation if, at the time as of which the valuation
is made, it reasonably would be expected that the enterprise will
continue as a going concern. Particularly in such a case, appropriate
values may be ascribed to goodwill and to nonassignable licenses,
franchises, contracts and rights. Often it would be appropriate not to
attempt to determine the value of separate assets and debts, but rather
to determine only the "enterprise value" representing the aggregate
difference between the debtor's assets and debts. Enterprise value
should be determined by methods appropriate in the circumstances.
It may be appropriate in many cases to determine enterprise value by
multiplying earnings or cash flow measures by appropriate multipliers,
or by discounting reasonably projected net cash flow at appropriate
rates, for example. Even if it is appropriate in a particular case to
value a business enterprise on a liquidation basis, it may be
appropriate to value some or all of the assets on the assumption that
they would be sold as one or more smaller going concerns (in which
case the assets so disposed of should be valued in like manner, with
appropriate values ascribed to goodwill and to licenses, franchises,
contracts and rights which are assignable or for which consent to

635, 648 (3rd Cir. 1991) (stating that the test of insolvency is "frequently described
as the 'balance sheet test"');
12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5102

(a) General rule.-A debtor is insolvent if, at fair valuations, the sum of the debtor's
debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets.
46. Comment (I) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5102. See Citizens State Bank, 450 N.W.2d at 926
(holding that pursuant to the UFTA a debtor is insolvent if he has no non-exempt assets or if his nonexempt assets minus his liabilities are less than or equal to zero).
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assignment may reasonably be expected; likewise, an "enterprise
valuation" of such assets and related debts may be appropriate).
As with valuation of assets, valuation of debts should take into
account all relevant factors. For example, debt due in the future
should not be valued at its face amount if the debt does not bear
interest or bears interest at an inappropriately low rate. Rather, the
face amount of such a debt should be discounted to its present value
at an appropriate rate to reflect the time value of money. Likewise,
in general, contingent liabilities and assets should be discounted by
factors representing the probability that such contingent liabilities or
assets will ever be realized (as well as by factors representing the time
value of money with respect to the resulting deferred payments or
collections). For example, if a debtor enters into a written guaranty,
the time as of which financial condition of the guarantor is to be
determined for purposes of analyzing whether its obligation under the
guaranty is fraudulent under 12 Pa.C.S. §§ 5104(a)(2) and 5105 is the
date on which such guaranty is executed and delivered.47
Practitioners should note that
values shown on a balance sheet prepared in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") generally would
not be fair valuations as that term is used in this section. Such a
balance sheet will have been prepared in accordance with accounting
conventions that do not for the most part purport to reflect fair
valuations (in any sense), nor will such a balance sheet necessarily
reflect all of the debtor's assets and debts as defined in this chapter.
For example, asset values under GAAP in most cases are based on
historical costs rather then current fair valuations, and accounting
conventions may ignore or relegate to footnotes certain assets and
debts that should be taken into account in determining fair valuation,
such as, for example, valuable contracts and leases, contingent assets
and liabilities, and goodwill arising from operations. In some cases,
however, a GAAP balance sheet may serve as a useful starting point
in analyzing whether a debtor is insolvent, given suitable adjustments
to the values of particular line-items and addition or deletion of lineitems.48
The Pa. UFCA definition of insolvency is broader than the definition
of insolvency found in the Bankruptcy Code and the Pa. UFTA.49

47.

Comment (1) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5102. See 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5106(5).

48. Id.
49. 39 PA. STAT. § 352 (repealed 1993). Insolvency
(1) A person is insolvent when the present, fair, salable value of his assets is less than
the amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on this existing debts as they
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A person is insolvent under the [Pa: UFCA] when the present, fair,
salable value of their [sic] assets is less than the amount required to
pay their [sic] probable debts as they become absolute and matured.
39 Pa. C.S.A. section 352(1) (1954). Insolvency under the [Pa.
UFCA] is broader than insolvency in bankruptcy, which is purely
mathematical and results when the aggregate value of the debtor's
property is less than their [sic] liabilities. (citation omitted) One is
insolvent under the [Pa. UFCA] if the present salable value of one's
assets is less than the amount required to pay existing debts as they
mature. (citation omitted)."0
Moreover, "Pennsylvania Courts have held that this solvency
definition contains two components. First, in the bankruptcy sense, a
transferor may be insolvent if it has a 'deficit net worth.' (citation
omitted) Second, insolvency 'in the equity sense' means 'the inability to
meet obligations as they mature."''
In establishing lack of insolvency under the Pa. UFCA, the debtor
must demonstrate both that it was not insolvent in the bankruptcy sense,
and also that the present value of its assets exceeded the sum of its
liabilities.5 2
A reasonable construction of the... statutory definition of insolvency
indicates that it not only encompasses insolvency in the bankruptcy
sense i.e., a deficit net worth, but also includes a condition wherein
a debtor has insufficient presently salable assets to pay existing debts
as they mature. If a debtor has a deficit net worth, then the present
salable value of his assets must be less than the amount required to
pay the liability on his debts as they mature. A debtor may have
substantial paper net worth including assets which have a small
salable value, but which if held to a subsequent date could have a
much higher salable value. Nevertheless, if the present salable value
of [his] assets [is] less than the amount required to pay exisfing debts
as they mature the debtor is insolvent. 3
While under the Pa. UFCA, the terms "present, fair, salable value"
were subject to differing judicial interpretation, 4 those terms clearly

become absolute and matured.
See In re Glenn, 108 B.R. 70, 74 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
50. In re Glenn, 108 B.R. 70, 74 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
51. Moody v.SEC. PAC. Business Credit, Inc., 127 B.R. 958, 994 (W.D. Pa. 1991), affd, 971
F.2d 1056 (3rd Cir. 1992).
52.

Id.

53. United States v. Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d 1288, 1303 (3rd Cir. 1986) (quoting Larrimer
v. Feeney, 192 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1963)) (emphasis added).
54. See Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 578 (holding that present, fair, salable value "means that
value which can be obtained if the assets are liouidated with reasonable promptness in an arms-length
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worked a significant modification on the standard balance sheet test. As
Larrimermakes clear, if transferors qualify as insolvent under the balance
sheet test found in the Bankruptcy Code and the Pa. UFTA, then the
transferors do not have presently salable assets available to pay their
existing debts." However, if transferors are solvent pursuant to the
balance sheet test, under Larrimer and the Pa. UFCA, those transferors
may still be found insolvent if the present salable value of their assets
will not sufficiently pay their debts as they mature. This insolvency test
is "not a difficult test to meet: 'in panic times, and during the earlier
portions of the periods of depression which follow, an enormous majority
of merchants' (citation omitted), though able to pay their bills, are, under
the UFCA definition of the term, insolvent." 6
Consequently, the balance sheet definition of insolvency adopted by
the Pa. UFTA will make proving insolvency more difficult under Pa.
UFTA section 5105 because creditors will no longer be able to rely on
the more accommodating equitable definition of insolvency. In fact,
section 5102(a) of the Pa. UFTA "clarifies that 'insolvency' is defined
solely in the 'balance sheet' sense." ' As a result, "cases construing
'insolvency' under the previous Act need not necessarily have any
persuasive force under this chapter."" However, "'[e]quity insolvency'
concepts are dealt with in 12 PA. CONS. STAT. section 5104(a)(2),"5 9 the
Pa. UFTA section which contains the other constructive fraud provisions
pertaining to undercapitalization and the debtors' belief that they will
incur debts beyond their ability to pay.6" The net result of this change

transaction in an existing and not theoretical market"); Moody, 127 B.R. at 995 (holding that in
determining present, fair salable value the Court cannot ignore the "economic realities of the
transfer," and assets must be valued at going concern values rather than at liquidation values unless
the company's failure is imminent).
55. See In re Joshua Slocum, Ltd., 103 B.R. 610, 626 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). aff'd 121 B.R.
442 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding that a debtor insolvent under the Code is also insolvent under the Pa.
common law insolvency test).
56. In re Fleet, 89 B.R. 420,425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (quoting McGill v. Commercial Credit,
243 F. 637, 646 (D. Md. 1917)).
57. Comment (1)to PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 5102.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 12 PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 5104. Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors
(a) General rule.-A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as
to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or
the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer
or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT

may be that creditors who allege that a fraudulent transfer was made by
an "equitably insolvent" debtors should plead their cases under section
5104(a)(2) rather than under section 5105.
Practitioners should also note that the Pa. UFTA definition of
insolvency "does not contain the words 'salable' or 'present,' thereby
removing any possible implication that liquidation is the required or
preferred basis of valuation or that, if liquidation value is appropriate in

a particular case, a prompt liquidation is necessarily appropriate."'"
While this change should clarify the confusion that existed about the
terms "salable" and "present" which were found in the Pa. UFCA, 62 it
is almost certain to lessen the evidentiary burdens historically imposed
upon parties defending allegedly fraudulent transactions.
Thus, in their attempts to "modernize" and "synchronize" the Pa.
UFCA provisions governing transfers by insolvents with the Bankruptcy
Code, the drafters of the Pa. UFTA have significantly altered the rights
of debtors and creditors. A creditor's task of proving that a fraudulent
transfer was made by an insolvent has been made much more difficult
under the Pa. UFTA. In addition to revising the definition of insolvency
in a manner detrimental to creditors, the Pa. UFTA also places the burden
of meeting the new standard of insolvency squarely on the shoulders of
creditors. The Pa. UFTA's imposition of the "rebuttable presumption" on
the transferor does little to even the score because the presumption fails
to provide creditors with the practical benefits enjoyed under the burden
shifting doctrine developed by the courts under section 354 of the Pa.
UFCA. Furthermore, although the drafters of the Pa. UFTA rejected the
burden shifting doctrine as an "archaism," they have elected to replace
that doctrine with an equally antiquated concept: the rebuttable
presumption. Rebuttable presumptions are notoriously confusing to
juries; consequently, the Pa. UFTA's rebuttable presumption of
insolvency will not facilitate juries' determination of correct and just
results.
Finally, it is not surprising that proving insolvency is more difficult
for creditors under the Pa. UFTA than under the Pa. UFCA. The Pa.
UFTA is derived from the Bankruptcy Code - and a central purpose of
the Code is to provide the debtor with a fresh start.63 Therefore, the
to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the
debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became
due.
61.
62.

Comment (1) to PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 5102.
See supra note 54.

63.

See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
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Bankruptcy Code is an unlikely place to find support for creditors' rights,
as evidenced by the fact that trustees, when attacking fraudulent transfers4
made by debtors, must prove all elements of a fraudulent transfer.
Although the drafters of the Pa. UFTA may have attempted to account
for these policy differences by establishing the rebuttable presumption of
insolvency, this presumption does not begin to restore the rights that
creditors previously possessed under the Pa. UFCA.
D. ConstructiveFraud.- Deletion of the Good Faith Requirement
The Bankruptcy Code and the Pa. UFTA both employ the term
"reasonably equivalent value" to describe the amount of consideration
required to circumvent a finding that a transfer is constructively
fraudulent.65 Although the Pa. UFTA does not define "reasonably
' the definition of reasonably equivalent value is
equivalent value,"66
"purely objective." 7
In contrast, the Pa. UFCA uses the term "fair consideration" to
describe the amount of consideration that is necessary to avoid a finding
of constructive fraud.6" Fair consideration consists of two elements:
property must be transferred for a "fair equivalent" and in "good
faith."69 For purposes of the Pa. UFCA, the issue of good faith turns
on the transferee's knowledge rather than its motives."' By relieving the
parties defending the transactions of any obligation to establish their
"good faith," the drafters have rendered irrelevant, to a consideration of
constructive fraud, the knowledge and intent of the parties. Here again
the change in law will favor debtors by reducing the issue of "fair

64. In re Apex Int'l Management Serv., 148 B.R. 647, 649 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); In re
DeVito, I II B.R. 529, 531 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re Metro Shippers, Inc., 78 B.R. 747, 750
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
65. See supra note 3.
66. See Comment (3) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5103.
67. See Comment (I) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5103.
68. 39 PA. STAT. § 353 (repealed 1993). Fair Consideration
Fair consideration is given for property or obligation:
(a) When, in exchange for such property or obligation, as a fair equivalent
therefore and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is
satisfied; or
(b) When such property or obligation is received in good faith to secure a
present advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as
compared with the value of the property or obligation obtained.
69. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1296 (3rd Cir. 1986)
(affirming trial court's holding that, since a lender knew or strongly suspected that transfer at issue
would probably render the transferor insolvent, the transferee lacked good faith).
70. Id. at 1295-96.
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consideration" to a mathematical proof which falls exclusively within the
province of expert testimony.
E. Constructive Fraud. Undercapitalizationand Leveraged
Transactions
The Code and the Pa. UFCA both permit avoidance of conveyances
if the debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value or fair
consideration for the transfers and if the debtors were engaged or were
about to engage in a business for which they were undercapitalized
because the debtors were left with unreasonably small amounts of
property.7 The Pa. UFTA contains a similar provision, but substitutes
'
the term "assets" for "property."72
This change will make it easier to
attack leveraged acquisitions as fraudulent conveyances than it was under
the Pa. UFCA. Because the Pa. UFTA excludes from its definition of
"asset" property that is encumbered by a valid lien,73 "a leveraged
acquisition that left a corporation with little or no unencumbered property
would be even more subject to attack than under present law."74
For example, in United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co. Inc.,"' the
court looked to encumbered land and property assets to determine
whether a target corporation acquired in a leveraged buy-out was
adequately capitalized under section 355 of the Pa. UFCA. However,
under the Pa. UFTA, a court will no longer be able to even consider
encumbered property in determining whether a debtor is unreasonably
undercapitalized under 12 PA. CONS. STAT. section 5104(A)(2)(i).
V. Other Issues
A. Statute of Limitations
By including specific statutes of limitations, the Pa. UFTA will
clarify existing law concerning the statute of limitations in fraudulent
transfer actions. Generally, under the Pa. UFTA, a four year statute of
limitations will govern both actions for actual and constructive fraud.76

71. See II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(BXii); 39 PA. STAT. § 355 (repealed 1993).
72. See 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104(a)(2)(i).
73. See 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5101(b)(I).
74. Michael L. Cook & Richard E. Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: An
Introductory Critique, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 91 (1988).
75. 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), affid in part and remanded, United States v. Tabor
Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, McClellan Realty Co. v. United
States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
76. 12 PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 5109. Extinguishment of cause of action
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In cases of actual fraud, the Pa. UFTA also makes provisions for a one
year discovery period. On the other hand, the Pa. UFCA contained no
specific statute of limitations and courts have applied different limitation
periods.""
Moreover, the comment to section 5109 of the Pa. UFTA notes that
this section's purpose is to clarify that lapse of the prescribed statutory
period "bars the right and not merely the remedy." ' Section 5109 also
of limitations
rejects the rule, applied in Gleneagles, that the state statute
79
States.
United
the
by
brought
action
an
to
did not apply
B. Deletion of PartnershipProvisions
The Pa. UFTA's deletion of the Pa. UFCA's provision that dealt
specifically with conveyances of partnership property"° will have little
effect on the law concerning conveyances of partnership property. Only
one decision, In re Messenger,"' has applied this provision. Therefore,
the Pa. UFTA's deletion of this provision should have little effect on the
law concerning partnerships and fraudulent conveyances. Indeed, under
the Pa. UFTA, a partnership will be treated like any other entity, with the
A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this chapter is
extinguished unless action is brought:
(1) under section 51 04(a)(I) (relating to transfers fraudulent as to present and future
creditors), within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could
reasonably have been discovered by the claimant; or
(2) under section 5104(a)(2) or 5105 (relating to transfer fraudulent as to present
creditors), within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred.
77. See In re Shields, 148 B.R. 783, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that two-year statute
of limitations delineated in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(7) applies in actions brought under Pa.
UFCA and explaining that earlier cases applying other limitations periods pre-dated the addition of
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(7)); In re Penn Packing Co., 42 B.R. 502, 504-06 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984) (when a cause of action predicated on the Pa. UFCA is directed against stockholders and
directors, the six year limitation of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5527 applies); Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp.
at 583 (noting that although the 6 year statute of limitations found at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5527
would governs creditors' fraudulent conveyance claim such limitation did not apply to the United
States which was seeking to enforce rights "held in its governmental capacity").
78. See Comment (I) to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5109.
79. Id.
80. 39 PA. STAT. § 358 (repealed 1993). Conveyance of partnership property
Every conveyance of partnership property and every partnership obligation incurred,
when the partnership is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, is fraudulent as to
partnership creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is incurred:
(a) To a partner, whether with or without a promise by him to pay partnership
debts; or
(b) To a person not a partner without fair consideration to the partnership as
distinguished from consideration to the individual partners.
81. 32 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
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exception that the Pa. UFTA, like the Pa. UFCA, has a partnership
definition of insolvency.82 The partnership provision of the Pa. UFCA
was deleted because it was considered to be "redundant in part and
susceptible to inequitable application."83
C. Insider ProvisionNot Adopted
The Pa. UFTA also failed to adopt section 5(b) of the UFTA which
deals with transfers made to insiders." The drafters explained the
omission of this section:
The transactions which are the subject of § 5(b) are not fraudulent
transfers as historically understood, however, but rather,
preferences."5 The Committee believes that it is inappropriate to
expand the fraudulent transfer laws to include preferential transfers.
As with other rights under fraudulent transfer laws, the rights created
by § 5(b) of the Uniform UFTA would be difficult or impossible, as
a practical matter, to adjust by contract, no matter how large a
majority of creditors might be willing to agree to such adjustment...
The Committee believes that preferential transfers are properly dealt
with under state law, if at all, only as an adjunct to a comprehensive
state insolvency law."6
However, the Pa. UFTA considers a transfer to an insider a Badge
of Fraud. 7

82. 12 PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 5102(c). When partnerships are insolvent
A partnership is insolvent under subsection (a) if, at fair valuations, the sum of the
partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate of all of the partnership's assets and the
sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's nonpartnership assets over the
partner's nonpartnership debts.
39 PA. STAT. § 352(2) (repealed 1993). Insolvency
In determining whether a partnership is insolvent, there shall be added to the
partnership property the present, fair, salable value of the separate assets of each general
partner in excess of the amount probably sufficient to meet the claims of his separate
creditors, and also the amount of any unpaid subscription to the partnership of each
limited partner, provided the present, fair, salable value of the assets of such limited
partner is probably sufficient to pay his debts, including such unpaid subscription.
83. Annex to Introduction: Prefatory Note to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act by the
National conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Report on the Pennsylvania Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act at 7.
84. (b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the
transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was
insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
85. See Comment (1)to 12 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5103.
86. Comment (2) to PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 5105.
87. See PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 5104(b)(l). The Pa. UFTA does not define the term "insider."
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D. Remedies
The Pa. UFTA will increase the remedies available to creditors with
unmatured claims. Under section 360 of the Pa. UFCA,s only creditors
with claims that had not matured could have the courts restrain
defendants from disposing of their property, appoint receivers, or make
any other orders that were required by the circumstances of the cases.
However, section 5107 of the Pa. UFTA 9 makes these remedies
available to all creditors.
VI. Conclusion
In summary, by adopting the Pa. UFTA, the legislature substantially
changed the Pennsylvania law of fraudulent transfers and significantly
altered the rights of debtors and creditors. Some of these modifications
are positive. For example, the statutory inclusion of a statute of
limitations in the Pa. UFTA will dispel confusion about this issue for
practitioners and litigants. In addition, making certain remedies available
to all creditors, regardless of whether their claims are matured, removes
an unreasonable inequity from the law of fraudulent transfers.

39 PA. STAT. § 360 (repealed 1993). Rights of creditors whose claims have not matured
Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to a creditor whose
claim has not matured, he may proceed, in a court of competent jurisdiction, against any
person against whom he could have proceeded had his claim matured, and the court may:
(a) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property;
(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the property;
(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation; or
(d) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require.
89. 12 PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 5107. Remedies of creditors
(a) Available remedies.-ln an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this
chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in sections 5108 (relating to defenses,
liability and protection of transferee) and 5109 (relating to extinguishment of cause of
action), may obtain:
(1) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy
the creditor's claim.
(2) An attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or
other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
applicable law.
(3) Subject to the applicable principles of equity and in accordance with
applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee,
or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or
of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(b) Execution.-If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the
creditor, if the court so orders, subject to the limitations of sections 5108 and 5109, may
levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.
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However, modifications made in the name of modernization,
clarification, and standardization of the Pa. UFCA should not be made to
the detriment of creditors. Indeed, there is no valid policy reason why
the law should reward debtors who allegedly engage in fraudulent
behavior by lessening their burdens in litigation at the cost of creditors.
Consequently, the Pa. UFTA's rejection of the burden shifting doctrine
developed under the Pa. UFCA, the Pa. UFTA's rebuttable presumption
of insolvency and its lesser burden of persuasion, and the Pa. UFTA's
narrower definition of insolvency are likely to substantially reduce
procedural advantages traditionally reserved for creditors under the
Pennsylvania laws of fraudulent conveyances.

